We conducted a cross-sectional survey of a random sample of 1943 spouses of home-dwellers with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) to examine the prevalence of court-appointed guardians or financial powers of attorney for persons with AD, related factors and the need for information about these issues among caregiving families. The questionnaire consisted questions on variables of demographic characteristics, disability, symptoms and care needs of the person with dementia, the strain of caregiving, the use of court-appointed legal guardians or powers of attorney, as (...) well as discussions about these issues—and the need for them—with a doctor. The response rate was 77% and the mean ages of those with AD and caregivers were 80.2 and 78.2 years, respectively. The use of legal guardians was rare (4.3%), while the use of financial powers of attorney was more common (37.8%). Only 9.9% of the couples had discussed these issues with their doctor, whereas 47.9% expressed a need for it. The factors associated with the use of these legal arrangements were related to the severity of dementia, including experiencing dementia symptoms for more than 3 years, poor functioning, incontinence and behavioural symptoms. There is a clear need for information on medico-legal issues related to dementia among caregivers of AD patients. If held soon after the diagnosis, such discussions could support the autonomy of these persons in spite of AD and enable them to plan for the future as they wish. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guest Editor’s Concluding RemarksMaki SATO 本特別号は戦前・戦後の東京、特に東京帝国大学、東京大学を活躍の場に据えた哲学者たちの智の営みに光をあて特集した初の試みである。「東京学派」との掛け声に対して、いったいどれくらいの論文が集まるのだろうか 、蓋を開けてみるまでは全く分からなかった。特別号編者の一人としては、東京という場で行われた様々な哲学者たちによる知的営みのうち、いつの時代の、どの哲学者が研究対 象となっているのかを知ることは大変興味深かった。巻頭論文としては、『日本哲学小史(Engaging Japanese Philosophy: A Short History)』を上梓されたオハイオ州立大学名誉教授のトマス・カスリス先生に、2019年1月下旬に東京大学東洋文化研究所にて行われた国際ワークショップ「日本哲学と東京大学の哲学」、また同年11月下旬 に東京大学本郷キャンパスにおいて開催された集中講義でお話しいただいた内容に基づき、基調論文を執筆いただいた。快くお引き受け下さったことに、ここに心から感謝の意 を示したい。 今回、収録した論文が取り上げていたのは、井上哲次郎(1856~1944)、清沢満之(1863~1903)、桑木厳翼(1874~1946)、大森荘蔵(1921~1997)である。西周(1829~1897 )がphilosophyを「希哲学」と翻訳してから、新たな学問として日本に哲学が根付き、西洋哲学の解釈から日本独自の哲学へと花開き始めた頃の哲学者が主に取り上げられている。東京の哲学者たちの知的営みの 多くは「京都学派」と比較すると忘却され、埋もれてしまった概念が他にも多々あるだろう。しかしながら、東京という場所において、彼ら哲学者たちが掴もうとしていた新たな概念は、常に確実に日本の中枢、政治や経済 のダイナミックな動向への応答としてあったものである。今後、日本哲学を通して私たち人類の行く先を見据える上でも、東京という場所において活躍した過去の哲学者たちが、言葉や概念で掴もうとしていたものを、本特 集号が、再度、取り上げて見直す一機会にな れば幸いである。 [End Page 125]This special issue is the first attempt to highlight the intellectual activities of philosophers who were active in prewar and post-war Tokyo, particularly at the Tokyo Imperial University and the University of Tokyo. I had no idea how many papers we would receive under the special issue “Tokyo School” until we closed (...) our call for papers. As one of the editors of the special issue, it was exciting to know, among the intellectual activities conducted by various philosophers based in Tokyo, which philosophers were the subjects of contemporary research from which period. It is fascinating to see and to read how the philosophical thinking of the past may resonate and still keep on inspiring us to face humanity’s issues of the twenty-first century.For the opening article, we invited Professor Emeritus Thomas P. Kasulis of Ohio State University, who published Engaging Japanese Philosophy: A Short History back in 2018, to write a keynote paper. He kindly sent us an article based on his presentations at the international workshop “Japanese Philosophy and the Philosophy of the University of Tokyo” held in late January 2019 at the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia and during an intensive lecture held in late November 2019 at the Hongo Campus. I would like to express our sincere gratitude to him for contributing to this special issue.The papers included in this volume cover Inoue Tetsujiro (1856–1944), Kiyosawa Manshi (1863–1903), Kuwaki Genyoku (1874–1946), and Omori Shozo (1921–97). The focus of this volume is on philosophers from the period when philosophy took root in Japan as a new discipline after Nishi Amane (1829–97) translated the word “philosophy” as tetsugaku. The late nineteenth to the early twentieth century was a transition period when philosophical thoughts began to blossom from an interpretation of Western philosophy into a unique style of Japanese philosophy, which I see as an attempt at amalgamation to close the gap between West and East.Compared to the well-studied Kyoto School centered around Nishida, from the Tokyo School there are probably many other concepts that have been forgotten and buried. The new concepts that philosophers of Tokyo were trying to grasp were always a response to the significant trends of the time, including responses to the dynamism of Japan’s political and economic situation, Tokyo being the capital of Japan. We hope that this special issue will provide [End Page 126] an opportunity to take a fresh look at and discover what the philosophers active in Tokyo were trying to grasp through words and concepts that still engage well with universal questions that remain relevant to the humanity of the current time. [End Page 127]Copyright © 2023 State University of New York Press... (shrink)

Niiles-Mäki, Anne Logotherapy as philosophical therapy - philosophical background, area of applicability, applied methods, Two-Staged Separation Diagnostics of disorders Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2021, 267 p. (JYU Dissertations ISSN 2489-9003; 432) ISBN 978-951-39-8863-0 (PDF) -/- This Dissertation belongs to the field of Philosophy. It deals with Logotherapy, a philosophical therapy form; its philosophical background, field of use, methods and diagnostics. Because of its nature as studying therapy, it belongs also in the field of human sciences and is a qualitative research. (...) As research approach, I have selected in philosophical research commonly used phenomenological-hermeneutic research approach and as for method, I chose content analysis method, which is necessary, in particular because one of the main aims in this study is to show how and why Logotherapy differs from the philosophical basis due to therapy forms that have emerged from the basis of Psychiatry and Psychology. Logotherapy also differs from other philosophical therapies because Logotherapy is based on Logotheory or Logophilosophy, which is a specific Existential-phenomenological theory, that has developed only to be applied in Logotherapy. This is why the content analysis of Logotherapy is a major part of studying Logotherapy. Logotherapy – unlike Psychotherapy – is focused on the Noological dimension of the consciousness, which is healthy by its principles. Psychotherapy doesn’t recognize the Noological dimension on the consciousness, but focuses on the disorders, that originate from the Psychic dimension of the consciousness. But the disorders in Noological and in Psychic dimension are different as their quality and not to be put together as mental disorders. -/- As research material, I have used the writings of Viktor Frankl, who developed Logotherapy, and the studies and theories concerning Logotherapy, that have been relevant to this study. I have also used the statistics and studies involving mental health, that have had interesting content and results related to Logotherapy. In this Dissertation, I also had to use the writings of the philosophers, psychiatrists and psychotherapists that influenced Viktor Frankl’s thinking and the writings of the philosophers, psychiatrists and psychotherapists that were relevant in studying and understanding the subject. This Dissertation is divided to 13 main chapters, from which the first six (1-6) deal with the basic assumptions and basic logotheoretic principles of the study, starting with methodology and studying process. Chapters 7-10 deal with the philosophical basis of Logotherapy, its field of use and applications. Chapters 11-12 present, among others, the Logotheoretic theory of consciousness and the Two-Staged Separation Diagnostics of disorders. Chapter 13 is focused on evaluation of the study and taking a stand towards new kind of logotherapeutic applications. Attachment “Exercise matrix for using in therapy process” is from A. Stropko. Exercise matrix has been modified and translated into Finnish. -/- Keywords: Viktor Frankl, Logotherapy, Logophilosophy, consciousness, Noological dimension of consciousness, Logotheoretic theory of consciousness, purpose, values, Existential Vacuum, Existential Analysis, worldview, Two-Staged Separation Diagnostics of disorders, medicalization. (shrink)

For the last three decades, the discussion on Hilary Putnam’s provocative suggestions around the issue of realism has raged widely. Putnam’s various formulations of, and arguments for, what he called internal realism in contrast to what he called metaphysical realism have been scrutinised from a variety of perspectives. One angle of attack has been missing, though: the view from the social sciences and the ontology of society. This perspective, I believe, will provide further confirmation to the observation that Putnam’s two (...) concepts of realism are all too aggregative in that they conflate elements that had better be kept distinct, at least for many important purposes (e.g. Niiniluoto 1996). The present essay can be read as an argument for a topic-specific examination of realism. This means that it challenges the overall validity of Richard Boyd’s arguments against what he calls “realism about”, that is, against “a certain fragmented conception of scientific realism, one according to which realism is deeply topic specific” (Boyd 1990, p. 175). Boyd takes the ‘x’ in realism about x” to designate two kinds of things: entities postulated in scientific theories (“realism about the ether” and “realism about higher taxa”) and scientific disciplines (“realism about physics” and “realism about biology”) (ibid., pp. 175, 190). He also suggests that “it seems possible cogently to accept realism about the natural sciences while denying it about at least some of the social sciences” (ibid., p. 191). In Boyd’s view, the possibility of realism about social sciences is undermined by their weak instrumental success; it is the instrumental reliability of method that he takes as the basis for a realist account of science. I do not underwrite this connection between realism and instrumental success, thus I am not compelled to reject realism about social sciences on these grounds; and, as we shall see, social sciences have other peculiarities as well (see Mäki 1996). I think we should, at least to some degree, disaggregate and relativize the issue of realism. I do have sympathy with Boyd’s strategic arguments against “realisms about”, but yet I believe realists will be better off by adopting a more concrete and localized approach to the issue (Mäki 2005). Social objects and social sciences deserve a separate treatment. There are two strategies that can be followed in examining a realism about x (type of entity, theory, discipline). One is to first fix the meaning of realism’ and then specify the extension of ‘x’. This is Boyd’s strategy. The other is to fix some part of the extension of ‘x’ and then adjust the meaning of ‘realism’ so as to accommodate whatever peculiarities the x in question may have (and finally to check whether the adjusted meaning of ‘realism’ meets the criteria of a minimal notion of realism; it would be here that we encounter a relatively fixed idea of some minimal realism, or a set of realist intuitions). The latter is my approach here. I begin with the interconnected ideas of “realism about social objects” andrealism about social sciences”. I am not only interested in what comes after ‘about’; I am also interested in what goes before it, namely ‘realism’ itself. Here is one premise of the discussion: the issue of proper forms of realism for dealing with specific problems is an issue to be settled at least partly a posteriori. Here is the problem for which a solution will be sought: what constraints, if any, does what we know about the social sciences and society (as depicted by the social sciences and our commonsense views) impose upon the forms of realism that can justifiably be adopted about them? This paper suggests to offer only some partial insight into this issue. It seeks to do so indirectly by discussing Putnam’s characterizations of internal and metaphysical realism. The focus will be on two aspects of Putnam’s realisms: [1] the role and kinds of independence and dependence (in relation to the human mind and related things); and [2] the possibility of error. It is shown that the nature of social objects has implications concerning the appropriate constraints on [1] and [2], and thereby on the kinds of realism that are available to social scientists. (shrink)

Aristotle's definition of the soul should be interpreted as: 'the soul is the entelechy of a natural body that serves as its instrument'.

This essay lays the groundwork for a novel conception of autonomy that may be called “effective autonomy”—a conception designed to be genuinely action guiding in bioethics. As empirical psychology research on the heuristics and biases approach shows, decision making commonly fails to correspond to people’s desires because of the biases arising from bounded cognition. People who are classified as autonomous on contemporary philosophical accounts may fail to be effectively autonomous because their decisions are uncoupled from their autonomous desires. Accordingly, continuing (...) attempts to value patient autonomy must go beyond existing philosophical conceptions of autonomy to consider the background conditions of human decision making. (shrink)

Epistemic trust is an unacknowledged feature of medical knowledge. Claims of medical knowledge made by physicians, patients, and others require epistemic trust. And yet, it would be foolish to define all epistemic trust as epistemically responsible. Accordingly, I use a routine example in medical practice to illustrate how epistemically responsible trust in medicine is trust in epistemically responsible individuals. I go on to illustrate how certain areas of current medical practice of medicine fall short of adequately distinguishing reliable and unreliable (...) processes because of a failure to systematically evaluate health outcomes. I conclude by articulating the devastating obstacles to the consilience assumption, which takes intellectual character as the standard for epistemic responsibility. (shrink)

In 1956, a few writings of Wittgenstein that he didn't publish in his lifetime were revealed to the public. These writings were gathered in the book Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). There, we can see that Wittgenstein had some discontentment with the way philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians were thinking about paradoxes, and he even registered a few polemic reasons to not accept Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

Many of the most serious crimes that fall within the justificatory scope of the harm principle do so constitutively. They do so in the sense that the harm that the crime is designed to prevent is a...

When should we make use of the criminal law? Suppose that a responsible legislature seeks to enact a morally justifiable range of criminal prohibitions. What criteria should it apply when deciding whether to proscribe conduct? Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs is a philosophical analysis of the nature, significance, and ethical limits of criminalisation. The authors explore the scope and moral boundaries of harm-based prohibitions, proscriptions of offensive behaviour, and 'paternalistic' prohibitions aimed at preventing self-harm. Their aim is to develop guiding principles (...) for these various grounds of state prohibition, including an analysis of the constraints and mediating factors that weigh for and against criminalisation. Both authors have written extensively in the field. In Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs they have reworked a number of well-known essays and added several important new essays to produce an integrated, accessible, philosophically-sophisticated account that will be of great interest to legal academics, philosophers, and advanced students alike"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The work _De spiritu_ is an important but neglected work by Aristotle. It clearly shows for the first time that Aristotle assumed a special body as the ‘instrument’ of the soul. By means of this soul/body the soul forms the visible body of plants, animals and human beings.

This paper objectively defines the three main contemporary philosophies of mathematics: formalism, logicism, and intuitionism. Being the three leading scientists of each: Hilbert (formalist), Frege (logicist), and Poincaré (intuitionist).

Leopold Kronecker (1823–1891) was a German mathematician who worked on number theory and algebra. He is considered a pre-intuitionist, being only close to intuitionism because he rejected Cantor’s Set Theory. He was, in fact, more radical than the intuitionists. Unlike Poincaré, for example, Kronecker didn’t accept the transfinite numbers as valid mathematical entities.

Husserl came over to philosophy from mathematics and he devoted many years to the formulation of a firm foundation for Philosophy that could even secure the status of "science" for it. But unlike some of his contemporaries (like Frege and Russell), he did not seek salvation for philosophy in the mathematical method. He argued philosophy (like any other field of study) should pay attention to uninterpreted basic experience and this would lead the way to understanding the essence of things. Essence, (...) then, would become conscious and this process was addressed by him as “phenomenological reduction.”. (shrink)

It is undeniable Poincaré was a very famous and influential scientist. So, possibly because of it, it was relatively easy for him to participate in the heated discussions of the foundations of mathematics in the early 20th century. We can say it was “easy” because he didn't get involved in this subject by writing great treatises, or entire books about his own philosophy of mathematics (as other authors from the same period did). Poincaré contributed to the philosophy of mathematics by (...) writing short essays and letters. (shrink)

Frege discussed Mill’s empiricist ideas and Kant’s rationalist ideas about the nature of mathematics, and employed Set Theory and logico-philosophical notions to develop a new concept for the natural numbers. All this is objectively exposed by this paper.

Let’s suppose all the rules of physics will change, but, before the change, we finally figured out everything there was to be figured out about physics. This means that we achieved pragmatic completeness at that point. It’s not a universal Platonic completeness, but everything there was to be expressed about the physics at that moment was expressed.

Kant and Descartes followed an extreme clever, secure way of reasoning. For them, there must be a world of differences, or of movement, before we can extract anything (ideas, laws, concepts, etc.) from the world. For Kant, these “changes” that secure the possibility of knowledge were the ones we can measure with the categories of space and time. While, for Descartes, since there exist two things: “me” and “the world”, we can say knowledge is possible. But I think we can (...) extract a more abstract, general principle from the similarities between both Descartes and Kant’s mobilist tendency. (shrink)

The criminal law presently distinguishes between actions and omissions, and only rarely proscribes failures to avert consequences that it would be an offense to bring about. Why? In recent years it has been persuasively argued by both Glover and Bennett that, celeris paribus, omissions to prevent a harm are just as culpable as are actions which bring that harm about. On the other hand, and acknowledging that hitherto “lawyers have not been very successful in finding a rationale for it,” Tony (...) Honoré has sought to defend the law's differential treatment. He proposes a “distinct-duties theory” that in addition to the general duties we owe to everyone, we also owe distinct duties to a more limited collection of people and associations, specified by features of our relationship with them. Where a distinct duty holds, breach by omission may well be no better than breach by positive action. But absent a distinct duty, omissions, per Honoré, are less culpable. They are mere failures to intervene and improve or rectify things, whereas actions are positive interventions which make things worse. And, thus, the law has good reason to differentiate between them. (shrink)

The book opens with a description of the smooth transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian behaviour from electrons as their energy is progressively increased, ...